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Burden of Proof and Choice of Forum
in Tax Litigation
The authors consider the burden of proof rules in Tax Court and in
refund suits as these rules bear upon the taxpayer's choice of forum
in tax litigation. The article points out that Rule 32 of the Tax Court
Rules of Practice, as it regards burden on proof on new matters, is not
as straightforward as it may appear and that the apparently contrary
rule applied in most refund suits is based upon distinguishable pre-
cedents and lack of proper analysis. Because the Tax Court and the
refund suit are merely alternative methods of resolving tax disputes,
the authors conclude that the choice of forum should not affect the
outcome of tax litigation. Therefore, they advocate the formulation of
rules which are clear enough to facilitate an enlightened choice of
forum, and which either provide consistent treatment regardless of
forum or permit an escape from a forum choice made before the full




Since the burden of proof may be a decisive factor in tax litigation,
it is important that the taxpayer be aware of the different rules in the
various forums to which he may take a tax controversy, and it is
essential that those rules operate fairly and consistently to enable the
taxpayer to choose his forum intelligently. It is the purpose of this
article to .examine the burden of proof in tax litigation as it affects
the choice of forum problem.
I. CHOICE OF FORUM IN TAx LITIGATON
A. Factors Governing Choice of Forum
When a tax controversy reaches the stage at which a statutory notice
of deficiency is issued, the taxpayer's counsel must promptly' choose
the forum in which the matter is to be litigated. Three alternatives2
* Associates, Warner, Norcross & Judd, Grand Rapids, Michigan.
1. The filing of a petition in the Tax Court within 90 days after the mailing of the
deficiency notice is jurisdictional. Because of the time required to prepare a petition,
the choice of forum usually must be made within 30 to 60 days after ,the deficiency
notice is received.
2. A fourth alternative-ignore the deficiency notice, fail to pay the tax and wait
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are open: a petition in Tax Court, a refund suit in district court, or a
refund suit in the Court of Claims. The choice of forum will be
determined by weighing a variety of considerations. While these
considerations have been adequately explored in the literature,3 a
brief review of some of them will be useful as a background for the
subsequent discussion.
1. Favorable Precedent.-Although Tax Court decisions are subject
to review by the circuit courts, the Tax Court considers itself a
national court, free to adopt rules of law in conflict with those laid
down by one or more circuit courts.4 Likewise, the Court of Claims
is not bound by decisions of either the Tax Court or a circuit court.
Thus, the existence of favorable or unfavorable precedent in the
available forums may be the deciding factor in the choice of forum.
2. Jury Trial.-A jury trial is available only in district court. It is
generally believed that jurors are sympathetic towards taxpayers and
are more apt to be influenced by the equities of the case and the
manner of presentation. Nevertheless, in a jury trial a taxpayer must
convince twelve jurors, rather than one judge, that he is entitled to
prevail. Also, the advantage of a jury trial is questionable when the
taxpayer is a corporation or other business entity.
3. Right of Appeal.-Decisions of the Tax Court or a district court
can be appealed to a circuit court. A decision of the Court of
Claims is reviewable only in the United States Supreme Court by
certiorari, which is infrequently granted. Of course, the decision of
the hearing commissioner in the Court of Claims may be appealed
to the entire court.
4. Discovery.-Liberal discovery will ordinarily operate to the ad-
vantage of the government, since the taxpayer already has free access
to his own records. In district court refund suits, the full discovery
procedures permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
available. Discovery in the Court of Claims is much more limited
because it requires leave of the court. Discovery in Tax Court is rare.
5. Familiarity with Tax Litigation.-Undoubtedly, Tax Court judges
have the highest degree of knowledge and sophistication with respect
to tax litigation. The Court of Claims would be next, since it handles
for the government's collection action-is usually to be avoided because of the risk
of penalties and expensive interference (through tax liens, garnishments and the
like) with business or personal affairs.
3. See, e.g., Tax Court Litigation-Forum; Pleadings, BNA TAx MANAGE IENT PORT-
FoLIo No. 152, at A-18-24 (1967).
4. Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 258 F.2d 562
(9th Cir. 1958).
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a substantial number of tax cases, and the distrct courts would be
least knowledgeable in the area. Technical and involved claims or
defenses would perhaps be more likely to succeed before a forum
possessing some measure of expertise.
6. Burden of Proof.-In Tax Court, the taxpayer must show the
Commissioner's determination to be incorrect. If he succeeds, then
the Commissioner must go forward and prove the correct tax liability
by a preponderance of the evidence.5 In a refund suit, the cases have
generally implied that the taxpayer has the burden of proving himself
entitled to the refund against any claim made by the government,
whether or not set forth in the deficiency notice.6
7. Settlement.-Settlement negotiations in refund cases are normally
conducted with the Department of Justice attorney who will try the
case, although other government representatives may be present
and Internal Revenue Service approval may be solicited. On the other
hand, early settlement discussions in Tax Court may not involve trial
counsel.
8. Oral Argument.-Oral argument is virtually nonexistent in Tax
Court. It is freely permitted in the Court of Claims upon request, and
is available as of right, in the same manner as in any other suit, in
district court.
9. Payment.-Payment in full is a prerequisite to a refund suit in
the district courts or the Court of Claims. Especially when the
deficiency is large, this factor alone may dictate that the matter be
taken to the Tax Court.
B. Choice of Forum and New Matters
The failure of the taxpayer to file a timely petition in the Tax
Court bars his entry into that forum.7 Likewise, the filing of a
petition in Tax Court prevents any later claim for refund for the
same taxable year.8 Thus, the choice of forum, at least as between
Tax Court and refund suit, is irrevocable. Therefore it is of utmost
importance that counsel be fully aware of all the contested issues in
his case prior to making his election.
5. See text accompanying notes 13-19 infra. As noted there, it has been suggested
that when a deduction is disallowed the taxpayer bears the burden of proving not
only that the Commissioner's grounds for disallowance are incorrect, but also that
all elements necessary to justify the deduction are present.
6. See text accompanying notes 53-89 infra.
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6213.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6512.
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Not infrequently, however, the Commissioner may raise a new issue
in his answer to a Tax Court petition or a refund suit which was not
disclosed in the statutory notice of deficiency. In one Tax Court case,9
the Commissioner's answer asserted that the taxpayer was on an
accrual rather than a cash basis, as reported on his return. The
deficiency notice was silent as to accounting method. In another
case, 10 the deficiency notice and the denial of the claim for refund
were based upon the disallowance of a cost of sales deduction for
that portion of the purchase price in excess of the legal ceiling, on
the ground that to permit such a deduction violated public policy. In
the refund suit the government abandoned this ground, but placed
in issue by its answer whether over-ceiling prices had in fact been
paid.
Although the government ordinarily is not barred from introducing
new elements into a tax controversy," the existence of a new issue may
frustrate the calculations which led to the taxpayer's choice of forum,
and arguably the government should assume, to some extent, the
burden of proof as to such new matter. This article analyzes the cases
both in Tax Court and in refund suits dealing with burden of proof
and offers some suggestions for the resolution of apparent inequities.12
II. BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO NEW MAT=ER IN TAx COURT
The burden of proof in Tax Court is allocated by Rule 32 of the
Tax Court Rules of Practice:
9. Thomas W. Briggs, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 440 (1956).
10. United States v. Harris, 216 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1954).
11. Some cases have indicated that the government may be absolutely precluded
from raising new issues as to which the substantive law required an "affirmative,
discretionary determination" by the Commissioner, such as § 482. In Maxwell Hard-
ware v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965), an appeal from Tax Court,
the court said: "With respect to the tax liability of Maxwell Hardware, no reliance
may be placed on section 482 to justify a decision because the Commissioner did
not rely upon it and gave no notice of such issues in his Notice of Deficiency to
Maxwell Hardware." Id. at 721. Accord, Luke v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 568 (7th
Cir. 1965), aff'g 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mew. 1022 (1964) (dictum); United States v.
First Security Bank, 334 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1964) (refund suit). Both Maxwell
Hardware and First Security Bank cite Commissioner v. Chelsea Prods., Inc., 197
F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952), which held only that § 482 could not be raised for the
first time at trial since the Commissioner had the duty to give the taxpayer fair
notice of his intention to rely on it. Contra, Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., 42 T.C.
601 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-2 Cum. ButL. 5, which may be qualified by the
court's observation that although § 482 was not mentioned in the deficiency notice or
pleadings, the taxpayer was fully aware that it was at issue. It should also be noted
that in some instances the government may be absolutely barred from raising items
from a different taxable year. See Dysart v. United States, 340 F.2d 624, 627 (Ct.
C1. 1965).
12. This article will not consider the "surprise" cases-those cases where the
government raises an issue so late as to prejudice the taxpayer in his trial preparation.
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The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise pro-
vided by statute, and except that in respect of any new matter pleaded
in his answer, it shall be upon the respondent.
13
This is frequently expressed as a presumption of the correctness of
the Commissioner's determination,14 with the taxpayer having the
burden of proving it incorrect.15 If the taxpayer sustains this burden,
then the burden of proving the correct amount of tax due shifts to
the Commissioner.16 However, the initial burden on the taxpayer
operates separately as to each item making up the deficiency, and even
though the Commissioner's determination is shown to be incorrect as
to some items, the presumption of correctness continues as to the
others.17
The cases generally have failed to distinguish between burden of
persuasion and burden of going forward with evidence. The few
that have made the distinction indicate that the taxpayer initially has
both burdens,' 8 and that both burdens shift to the Commissioner
once the taxpayer has shown the determination to be incorrect. 9
A. Rule 32 Places Burden on Commissioner
Rule 32 provides that as to "new matter pleaded in his answer" the
burden of proof is on the Commissioner. On its face, this provision
does not appear difficult to interpret or apply and, indeed, a number
of cases support its straightforward application.20 In A. 'F. Lowes
13. Rule 32 was adopted pursuant to INr. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 7453, and upheld
in Golbert v. Renegotiation Bd., 254 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1958).
14. See, e.g., 9 J. MmTENS, LAw OF FEDmuL INcOME TAxATION § 50.61 (Zimet
rev. ed. 1965).
15. The burden of proof rests on the Commissioner by statute in some instances, as,
for example, in fraud or transferee cases. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6902(a),
7454(a).
16. Herbert v. Commissioner, 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (U.S. Tax Cas.)
II 9160 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1966); Grubb v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.
1963); Stout v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1959); Cohen v. Commissioner,
266 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1959).
17. Anderson v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
950 (1958).
18. Herbert v. Commissioner, supra note 16.
19. Herbert v. Commissioner, supra note 16; Merritt v. United States, 327 F.2d 820
(5th Cir. 1964) (dictum). Hereafter "burden of proof" will include both the burden
of persuasion and the burden of going forward, unless otherwise indicated.
20. See, e.g., James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964);
Commissioner v. Erie Forge Co., 167 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1948); Commissioner v. Fleming,
155 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. Hofheimer's Estate, 149 F.2d 733
(2d Cir. 1945); Athens Roller Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.
1943); Eva Rubin, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1089 (1963); A. F. Lowes Lumber Co., 19
CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 727 (1960); Leon Papineau, 28 T.C. 54 (1957); .Thomas Wilson,
2,5 T.C. 1058 (1956); Sheldon Tauber, 24 T.C. 179 (1955), acquiesced in, 1955-2
Ctmf. BuLL. 9; Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc., 16 T.C. 870 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2
Ctrw. BuLL. 2; Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 10 T.C. 7 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 187
F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
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Lumber Co.,21 the deficiency notice disallowed a loss deduction on a
ground which was rejected by the Tax Court. In Tax Court, the
Commissioner asserted as an additional ground that the loss had not
been incurred in the taxable period under review. Holding against the
Commissioner on that ground also, the court said that "when respon-
dent departs from the grounds relied on in his deficiency notice to
sustain a theory later raised, he has the burden of proving any new
matter raised."22 Again, in Daniel H. Axelroad' 3 the deficiency notice
attacked the figure reported by the taxpayer as gross profits, but
did not challenge his figure for gross sales. When the Commissioner
raised this issue in the Tax Court, it was held that he had the
burden of proof under Rule 32, and that he had failed to sustain it.
In ruling that the Commissioner has the burden of proof, the
courts occasionally appear to rely on the fact that the Commissioner's
new assertions resulted in increased deficiencies.24 This is not required
for the operation of Rule 32, and is no more than an unnecessary
alternative basis for placing the burden of proof on the Commissioner,
as was recognized by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens
Roller Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner5 although the Commissioner there
asked for increased deficiency.26 The likely explanation of this and
similar cases is that the courts have used an increased deficiency as a
signal that "new matter" is involved, rather than simply new theory.21
For example, in Leon Papineau2 the court noted, in ruling that the
Commissioner had the burden of proof, that the new grounds asserted
by him resulted in a decreased, rather than an increased, deficiency.
Another line of cases appears to attach some significance to the
inconsistency of the new grounds asserted with those alleged in the
deficiency notice. In Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc.2 9 the statutory
notice alleged that a partnership was a sham. Later the Commissioner
changed his ground and asserted that, while the partnership existed,
the interest reported as belonging to one partner actually belonged
to another. The court held that the Commissioner had the burden of
proving this new assertion, but commented that he could have
21. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 727 (1960).
22. Id. at 743.
23. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 626 (1962).
24. See, e.g., W. H. Weaver, 25 T.C. 1067 (1956).
25. Supra note 20.
26. "The disallowed item here in question was brought into the record as new matter
by the respondent. Rule 32 . . . provides that the burden of proof . . . in respect to
any new matter plead in his answer . . . shall be upon respondent. Aside from the
nle, the burden of proof rests on the Commissioner where he seeks an increase in the
deficiency on a ground not stated in his statutory notice of deficiency." Supra note 20
at 127-28 (emphasis added).
27. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
28. 28 T.C. 54 (1957).
29. 16 T.C. 870 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2 Cimi. BULL. 2.
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protected himself by making alternative inconsistent determinations
in the notice. Similarly, in Eva Rubin30 the deficiency notice had
characterized certain advances as non-business bad debts, but the
Commissioner subsequently argued that they were contributions to
capital. The court held that the Commissioner had the burden of
proof on this new ground, citing Rule 32 as the basis for so holding,
but noting in addition that the new ground was inconsistent with the
one previously asserted. Rule 32 does not indicate that new matter
must be inconsistent with the previous determination before the
burden of proof will be placed upon the Commissioner, and it is
suggested that here again the courts have merely used the existence
of inconsistency as a convenient indication that the new grounds are
"new matter and not merely new theory.31
B. Contrary Authority Can Be Reconciled
Despite the apparent abundance of authority for a straightforward
application of Rule 32, many courts have found the phrase "new
matter" "exceedingly difficult to define and apply."n It has even
been suggested that the cases are irreconcilable.3 3 A careful reading
reveals, however, that most of the cases can be reconciled with the
analysis set forth above, or convincingly demonstrated to be in
error.
1. Mistaken Reliance on Refund Cases.-Bernstein v. Commis-
sionel34 is typical of those cases which have mistakenly imported
refund suit rules into Tax Court proceedings. In Bernstein the de-
ficiency notice asserted that certain bank deposits represented un-
reported sales of a partnership. Subsequently, the Commissioner
claimed that these deposits were unreported income of the decedent
taxpayer, rather than sales of the partnership, and therefore were
fully includible in his income. Ruling that the burden of proof re-
mained on the taxpayer, the court said that "the taxpayer has the
burden of showing that the assessment is wrong on any proper
theory."5 As discussed below,6 the burden of proof rule in refund
cases has long been held to be different from that in Tax Court.
37
But all of the authorities cited by the Fifth Circuit in Bernstein stem
from the Supreme Court decision in Reinecke v. Spalding,38 which was
30. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1087 (1963).
31. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
32. Forman, The Burden of Proof, 39 TAxEs 737, 740 (1961).
33. Marcossan, The Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 29 TAXEs 221 (1951).
34. 267 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1959).
35. Id. at 881.
36. See text acompanying notes 53-55 infra.
37. See, e.g., DuPont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964).
38. 280 U.S. 227 (1930).
1967 ] 1185
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a refund suit. Thus, Alexander Sprunt & Son v. Commissioner,39 cited
in Bernstein, relies upon J. & 0. Altschul Tobacco Co. v. Commis-
sioner,40 also cited in Bernstein. Altschul in turn relies on Reinecke,
as does Gowran v. Commissioner,41 the sole remaining authority cited
on this point in Bernstein. Other cases reflect the same error.42
2. New Theory.-Some cases have drawn a distinction between
"new matter" and new theory, holding that the burden of proof
remains on the taxpayer when the Commissioner merely relies on a
new theory to sustain a deficiency already asserted in the statutory
notice.43 Such a rule will not stand careful analysis. Burden of proof
has meaning only in relation to disputed issues of fact. When the
facts are conceded, or when a new claim asserted by the Commissioner
places no fact in dispute which was not already in issue under the
statutory notice, there is no justification for shifting the burden of
proof. Thus, for example, in Hilbert L. Bair" the facts were stipulated.
In the deficiency notice the Commissioner had set forth a theory
that the taxpayer constructively received certain unreported income.
Subsequently, relying upon the stipulated facts, the Commissioner
urged a theory of actual receipt. In such a context, the location of
the burden of proof is meaningless, since the court must decide the
legal effect of settled facts without regard to any presumptions or
burdens. 45 Consequently, the phrase "new matter" in Rule 32 should
be read to mean "new factual matter,"46 and the burden of proof
should rest on the Commissioner as to new factual matters raised
or relied upon in his answer and not previously in issue under the
statutory notice of deficiency. This would permit the reconciliation
of almost all of the "new theory" cases, with the possible exception
of those following Burnet v. Houston,47 which holds that when a
deduction has been disallowed, the taxpayer has the burden of proving
not only that the grounds for disallowance in the deficiency notice
are erroneous, but also every factual element necessary to support the
deduction, apparently on the premise that deductions are matters
of legislative grace.
39. 64 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1933).
40. 42 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1930).
41. 87 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1936).
42. See, e.g., Beaumont v. Helvering, 73 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Crowell v.
Commissioner, 62 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1932).
43. See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937); Forman, supra note 32. In
Gowran the Court pointed out that the facts were "undisputed."
44. 16 T.C. 90 (1951).
45. Ray v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1960).
46. See George B. Markle, Jr., 17 T.C. 1593 (1952).
47. 283 U.S. 223 (1931). See, e.g., Clapp v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.
1963); Melvin Rogers, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 36 (1965).
[ VOL. 201186
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3. Broadly Worded Deficiency Notice.--A third line of cases holds
that the burden of proof does not shift to the Commissioner if the
deficiency notice is stated in terms broad enough to encompass the
later asserted ground. In one case,48 the deficiency notice had stated
that a certain distribution was "fully taxable ...at ordinary income
rates under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939." 49
The Commissioner subsequently relied on the collapsible corporation
provision.50 The court held that the burden of proof remained on
the taxpayer, since the broad wording of the deficiency notice was
sufficient to raise the collapsible corporation issue. To the same
effect is C. D. Spangler,51 in which the court of appeals opinion
stated:
As the Tax Court points out . . . the deficiency notice originally was in
broad terms. There was no inconsistency or conflict between the notice
and the Commissioner's later answer to the taxpayer. We therefore agree
that the burden of proof did not shift to the Commissioner .... 52
III. BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO NEw MATTER IN R1.EFUND SurrS
The taxpayer's alternative to an action in Tax Court is a suit for
refund 3 after payment of the tax in either a United States district
court or the United States Court of Claims. As we have noted, there
may be compelling reasons for the election of this option and the
choice of one of these forums. However, the decision to sue for
refund must be weighed carefully in each case because the cases
commonly state that the burden of proof is somewhat greater in
refund suits.m
In the normal case in which the government's position remains
consistent with the statutory notice of deficiency throughout, the
basic issue involves not only the correctness of the Commissioner's
48. Arthur Sorin, 29 T.C. 959 (1958), aff'd per curiain, 271 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.
1959), acquiesced in, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 6.
49. 29 T.C. at 968.
50. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(m) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341).
51. 32 T.C. 782 (1959), aft'd, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
825 (1960). It should be noted that Spangler overruled Thomas Wilson, 25 T.C.
1058 (1956), where on nearly identical facts the Tax Court had said that "[w]hile a
statutory notice of deficiency is presumed correct, -and a petitioner has the burden of
disproving its correctness, when the Commissioner departs from the grounds relied
on in his deficiency notice to sustain a theory later raised, he has the burden of proving
any new matter raised." Id. at 1066.
52. 278 F.2d at 670. See also Luke v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1965),
aff'g 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1022 (1964); Little v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 746 (1st
Cir. 1960); Barbourville Brick Co., 37 T.C. 7 (1961).
53. There are, of course, refund suits which are not preceded by a statutory notice
of deficiency, as in First Natl Bank v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
There is also the possibility of a collection suit by the government, as in United States
v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1965).




specific determinations but also the more general question of whether
the taxpayer has overpaid his tax.55 Inherent in this statement is the
imposition of the burden of proof upon the taxpayer to demonstrate
sufficient facts from which a correct determination of the tax, insofar
as the items and theories cited in the deficiency notice are concerned,
may be made.5 6 But the problems are to determine what the rule is
with respect to new factual issues subsequently advanced by the
government to support the same deficiency, and to determine what
principles are to govern when the Commissioner asserts new items
in the same return or other deficiencies in unrelated returns as defenses
to the refund suit.57 The danger of confrontation with an unantici-
pated issue in this respect cannot be ignored in any consideration of
the factors relevant to the choice of forum. A cursory review of the
language frequently expressed to describe the nature and function of
refund suits intimates that the burden of proof must remain with the
taxpayer across an extremely broad framework of potential defenses. 8
Nevertheless, the extent to which the burden of proof has been
imposed upon claimants in refund suits faced with new matters,
and the extent to which it ought to be, is far less clear than the
language of many opinions would imply.
55. Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964); Light Aggregates,
Inc. v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 253 (W.D.S.D. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 343
F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1965); Myers v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 520 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
further opinion, 142 F. Supp. 365 (Ct. Cl. 1956); 10 J. MEnTENs, LAw oF FEDEAL
INCOME TAXATON §§ 58A.01, 58A.35 (Zimet rev. ed. 1965).
56. Roybark v. United States, 218 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1954).
57. Any generalization of this nature has exceptions. For example, the same item
is in issue when the government belatedly raises tax liability which would result from
its inclusion in a return for another year, Ryan v. Alexander, 118 F.2d 744 (10th Cir.
1941); or for another closely related taxpayer, Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937).
Furthermore, the nature of the "item" in dispute is not always clear as in David v.
Phinney, 350 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1965), in which it could have been the purchase
price of an option or the entire capital gains of the taxpayer under permissible inter-
pretations. Finally, the new matter can be a distinct, non-tax debt. Woodward v. United
States, 109 F. Supp. 414 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
58. Examples are cited at notes 87 & 88 infra. The principal example and
leading case is Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 (1932). Any discussion of burden
of proof in refund suits must be formulated in view of this case, for it illustrates
both the unrestricted statements and the absence of a squarely presented issue with
respect to burden of proof; and these two factors form the basis of many of the
conclusions in this section. At issue was the right of the government to raise a new
and different item on the same tax return in defense of a refund claim, when a new
deficiency based upon the new item was barred by the limitations period. No issue as
to the burden of proof upon the defense is revealed by the opinion, and the rationale of
the decision must be limited to approval of the defense. The broad language adopted
by the court, however, could imply burden of proof rules: "It follows that the ultimate
question presented for decision, upon a claim for refund, is whether the taxpayer has
overpaid his tax. This involves a redetermination of the entire tax liability. .. . The
action to recover on a claim for refund is in the nature of an action for money had and
received and it is incumbent upon the claimant to show that the United States has
money which belongs to him." 284 U.S. at 283.
1188 [ VOL. 20
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In a refund suit in which the government does not depart from
the statutory notice, both the burden of going forward and the burden
of persuasion require that the taxpayer produce sufficient evidence to
justify the tax consequences which he contends should flow from
the challenged items.5 9 He may conclusively demonstrate that the
theory of the deficiency is erroneous in law or fact or both and yet
have the issue resolved against him.60 Thus, he may be faced with
an adverse decision in a case which would have been successful in
the Tax Court forum, 61 where the only burden is to prove the in-
correctness of the Commissioner's determination. 62 Roybark v. United
States' is a classic example, for the decision is often cited in cases
involving new defenses. The claimant was an automobile retailer who
bad deducted cost increments above the legal ceiling price of auto-
mobiles on the returns in question. Statutory notice was based upon
the theory that these deductions were invalid. At trial, the tax-
payer offered no proof other than the tax returns. By that time,
decisions in several other cases had reached conclusions unfavorable
to the government upon the same legal theory for the deficiency, and
the trial court had no difficulty in agreeing. 4 Nevertheless, noting an
obvious inaccuracy in the returns before the court, the government
contended that the taxpayer had failed to meet his burden of proof.6
Reluctantly, the court held that in spite of proving the Commissioner's
theory erroneous, the taxpayer must fail, because he had not offered
persuasive evidence on the precise amount of the deductions in
question. 6  The Ninth Circuit affirmed with the observation that the
principles relied upon by the lower court and argued by the govern-
59. See, e.g., Compton v. United States, supra note 55.
60. "There can be little doubt that the theory behind the Commissioner's assessment
was legally wrong, but that is not sufficient." Roybark v. United States, 104 F. Supp.
759, 762 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aft'd, 218 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1954) (taxpayers failed to
offer sufficient proof to show they overpaid their taxes for the years in question). See
also DuPont v. United States, supra note 37.
61. Undoubtedly in some cases there will be no difference in the quantum of
proof sufficient to prove error on a factual issue by the Commissioner and to prove
the correct amount of the tax liability.
62. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
63. 104 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 218 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1954).
64. 104 F. Supp. at 760-61.
65. Id. at 761. Because black market prices were involved, taxpayer's records did
not reflect details of the transactions, and he was presumably unwilling to testify. The
government argued successfully that such records were not acceptable under the
annual accounting concept of income tax reporting, and therefore failed to show
adequately an overpayment.
66. The reasoning of the court was based principally upon the statements quoted
from Lewis v. Reynolds in note 58 supra, and statements in Taylor v. Commissioner, 70
F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd sub nom. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935),
a Tax Court suit which contrasted, by way of dicta, the responsibilities of claimants
in refund suits and in Tax Court cases.
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ment in the appeal appeared to be settled lawY7 Thus, in Roybark
there was no new theory. On appeal the government virtually con-
ceded the erroneous basis for its deficiency assertion and relied upon
the burden of proof.6 8
If, as Roybark demonstrates, the taxpayer must not only show error
by the Commissioner but also prove the essential facts establishing
the correct tax consequences of the items challenged in the deficiency
notice, the result cannot logically be different where the government
asserts new factual theory for the same deficiency based upon the
same items.69 There is no real distinction between the two situations,
except that in the latter the government has assumed a more afflima-
tive role by pointing expressly to new and different ways in which the
taxpayer's case on the items in issue may be deficient. Moreover, it
is reasonable to require a taxpayer to anticipate and be prepared for
such defenses when he knows the item is in issue.
Although it would appear, as the Ninth Circuit observed, that the
basic burden of proof rule with respect to the items encompassed by
the statutory notice, with or without new factual issues, is settled law,
there are cases which demonstrate otherwise.70  If these cases are
not erroneous, they are deprived of vitality by their complete reliance
upon Tax Court cases or by unsupported reasoning similar to that in
many Tax Court decisions.7 Arguments by the taxpayer based upon
67. 218 F.2d at 166.
68. It should be noted for purposes of the subsequent discussion that, in spite of the
broad language of the opinion and its reliance upon cases with similarly general
expressions, the rationale of the decision is necessarily confined to instances where no
new factual matter or new items are raised in defense.
69. The statement may be illustrated by comparing Roybark, supra note 60, with
United States v. Harris, 216 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1954), which also involved deduction
of over-ceiling prices of automobiles. In Harris, though, the government specifically
denied the fact of such payments even though the earlier revenue agent's report indi-
cated that they had been made. Reversing an order granting summary judgment for
the taxpayer, the court held that this new theory for the disallowed items created a
factual issue upon which the taxpayer clearly bore the burden of proof. Aside from
Harris, cases illustrating the point are rare. If it be assumed that David v. Phinney,
350 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1965), imposes the burden upon the taxpayer to prove the
absence of value for a covenant not to compete, which issue was subsequently raised
in further support of the deficiency, then that case is illustrative. The applicability
of DuPont v. United States, supra note 37, is unclear since the new basis for the
defense, if any, was not described. Morrill v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.
Me. 1964), is technically in point, but there the new basis for the deficiency appears
to have resulted from a mere administrative error that should have been apparent to
the taxpayer. Finally, Blansett v. United States, 283 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1960) (see
also opinion below at 181 F. Supp. 637), is considered inapplicable on close analysis.
70. United States v. First Wis. Trust Co., 92 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1937); Service Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 282 (D. Neb. 1960), aff'd on other grounds,
293 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1961); Massingale v. United States, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas., ir 9298
(D. Ariz. 1959).
71. In Massingale v. United States, supra note 70, the court held, without citing
authority, that the taxpayer has the burden of proving the incorrectness of the statutory
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two of them were ill-fated in the only case which has discussed them
to date, in which the Delaware district court rejected them in favor
of what it described as the more persuasive reasoning in Roybark.72
They should, therefore, be given little credence as contrary authority
or a minority view.73
The more difficult question is the rule to be applied in cases where
the government raises a new and unrelated item in the same return
or an item in another return. With respect to the former, two cases
discuss the issue and clearly impose the burden of proof upon the
taxpayer.74 However, both of these cases place total reliance upon
earlier decisions which are either distinguishable on the facts or did
not involve burden of proof as an issue.7 5 Other cases in point which
contain broad language implying burden upon the taxpayer similarly
do not indicate that burden of proof was raised and argued by either
party.7 6 Two cases reach a contrary result, placing the burden of
proof upon the government, but one has been expressly overruled and
the other relies indiscriminately upon Tax Court decisions .7
With respect to new items in a different return, it appears that the
only case of current vitality which meets the question directly and
persuasively is the 1964 decision of the Court of Claims in Missouri
Pacific R.R. v. United States.78 This case also discusses the rule with
respect to new items in the same return. At issue in Missouri Pacific
notice, but the burden of proof is on the Commissioner to prove any new matter
raised when he departs from the assertions of the statutory notice to sustain a theory
later raised.
72. DuPont v. United States, supra note 37.
73. See 10 J. MERns, supra note 55, § 58A.35 at 98.
74. United States v. Pfister, 205 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1953); First Natl Bank v. United
States, 235 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
75. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 53, states that the burden is upon the taxpayer with
respect to the entire return or returns in question, citing Roybark v. United States, 218
F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1954) and Lewis v. Reynolds, supra note 58, without discussion.
See notes 58 & 69 supra. Pfister, supra note 74, clearly imposes the burden upon the
claimant with respect to a new item in the same return. The opinion paraphrases
conclusions from a number of cases which are either from Tax Court, Helvering v.
Taylor, supra note 66; or did not involve a new item, Roybark, supra note 56; or
involved no issue on burden of proof, Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329
U.S. 296 (1946); Champ Spring Co. v. United States, 47 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1931).
Again there is no comparative discussion of the authorities cited in the case.
76. See Lewis v. Reynolds, supra note 58; Cuban R.R. v. United States, 254 F.2d
280 (2d Cir. 1958); Larrabee v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
77. In Squire v. Denman, 18 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Ohio 1936), in which the new
matters were not raised until trial, the court distinguished Lewis v. Reynolds, supra
note 58, as not bearing upon burden of proof, but then cited only Tax Court cases for
its conclusion that the burden was upon the government. The question of new matter
was not considered on appeal. Squire v. Denman, 111 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1940).
78. 338 F.2d 668 (Ct. Cl. 1964). In reaching its conclusion, Stone v. White, supra
note 57, and Ryan v. Alexander, supra note 57, were rejected, because the burden
of proof was not in issue. United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926), was rejected
because, though different years were involved, this was clear from the outset.
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was the effect of the commissioner's disallowance in the statutory
notice of certain depreciation deductions on taxpayer's liability to pay
excess profits tax. In defense of the suit for refund, the government
alleged improprieties in the foreign tax credit in the claimant's 1950
income tax return as a set-offZ9 Taxpayer moved for an order fixing
the burden of proof upon this defense, and the court commissioner
imposed the burden upon the government.80 The government ap-
pealed this pre-trial ruling to the full court. The court first discussed
factual distinctions between new matters raised as defenses which
involved new items in the same or a related and dependent return
for the same year and new items involving an unrelated tax.8t In
this connection, the court viewed a new item involving the same type
of tax for a different year as falling within the unrelated category.82
The court discussed favorably prior authority which viewed a refund
suit as in the nature of an action for money had and received, and
which asserted that the entire tax liability of the claimant was thereby
put in issue. Concluding, however, that these principles did not
extend to new items involving an unrelated tax and, more importantly,
that they were not controlling as to the burden of proof,83 it stated
that the burden of persuasion would remain upon the taxpayer with
respect to new items in the same or a related return and that both
the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion would
remain upon the government throughout as to new items involving
79. The government also maintained its position with respect to the items included in
the original deficiency notice.
80. The hearing commissioner described his ruling as following a minority view,
but he felt compelled to follow the earlier Court of Claims decision, Continental Ill.
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 229 (Ct. Cl. 1937), which was
expressly overruled at the outset in the principal case on the finding that the burden
of proof issues had not been adequately presented in the former.
81. Specifically, the court described the following four situations: "An item (1)
found in the same tax year involving the same type of tax for which a refund is
sought, (2) in the same year involving a different type of tax which, however, is
related and ultimately affects the amount of tax liability involved in the suit for refund,
(3) in the same year involving a different type of tax which is independent of and
unrelated to the tax involved in the suit for refund, (4) in another year involving
any type of tax whether related or unrelated." 338 F.2d at 670. This general language
was given further explanation and limitation in a subsequent passage in the opinion:
"Thus, when the government by way of a setoff challenges the validity of the tax
treatment accorded an item found in the same return or in a related and dependent
tax return (situations (1) and (2) outlined above), we think the burden of proving
the correctness of the challenged item is ultimately on the taxpayer. When the
challenged item is found in an unrelated tax return (situations (3) and (4)), we
think that the burden of proof remains on the government throughout the entire
proceedings." 338 F.2d at 671. The court also noted that it was not concerned
with the right of the government to challenge items found in unrelated returns but
only with the burden of proof once that right had been established.
82. See note 80 supra.
83. 338 F.2d at 671.
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an unrelated tax. It further held, however, that the burden of going
forward with evidence sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable basis in
law or in fact, as opposed to mere theory, would rest upon the
government in the first instance with respect to new items in the
same or a related retum.84
While it may not be possible to derive a general rule for refund
suits on the basis of this case alone,85 the case must be viewed as a
welcomed venture beneath the surface of sterile phrases that have
been repeated without careful scrutiny for more than thirty years.
Its underlying conclusions should provide substantial assistance to
counsel in seeking to avoid mechanical extensions of the basic
burden of proof rules to more remote issues.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that any attempt to formulate
currently applicable rules with respect to new items in the same or a
different return is difficult. Most of the modem cases rely only upon
Lewis v. Reynolds and Roybark, both of which can be distinguished;
and Roybark in turn relies upon Tax Court cases, cases that do not
involve new items,87 and cases which do not indicate that the burden
of proof was directly in issue.8 Aside from Missouri Pacific R.R. v.
United States,89 the cases demonstrate a common failure closely to
analyze the prior decisions and to reach an informed conclusion.
Further analysis is essential to careful development of rules which are
both certain and fair.90 It is hoped that the Missouri Pacific case is the
first step in this direction.
84. In this connection the court commented upon the heavy cost to taxpayers if
they were required to prove every item involved in a tax return. The court instructed
its hearing commissioners to determine whether the government has met the burden
of going forward at the pretrial.
85. While it was only necessary for the court to determine the burden of proof
with respect to items in unrelated returns for purposes of the decision, it must be
noted that the court was consciously establishing general burden of proof rules for the
future in the Court of Claims.
86. Helvering v. Taylor, supra note 66; Beaumont v. Helvering, supra note 42;
Alexander Sprunt & Son v. Commissioner, supra note 39. In this connection both
opinions in Roybark- are considered together.
87. Stone v. White, supra note 57; Reinecke v. Spalding, supra note 38; United States
v. Harris, supra note 69; Harvey v. Early, 189 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1951); Maroosis v.
Smyth, 187 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951); Forbes v. Hassett, 124 F.2d 925 (1st Cir. 1942);
Champ Spring Co. v. United States, supra note 75; Globe Gazette Printing Co. v.
United States, 13 F. Supp. 422 (Ct. CL. 1936).
88. Lewis v. Reynolds, supra note 58; Ryan v. Alexander, supra note 57; Routzahn
v. Brown, 95 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1938); Swift Mfg. Co. v. United States, 12 F. Supp.
453 (Ct. Cl. 1935). Sorie of the cases cited in note 87 supra may be included in
this category also.
89. See note 78 supra.
90. Morgan states that the test for allocating the burden ought to be and is under
many modem decisions determined by considerations of fairness, convenience and
policy. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EviDENcE 17 (4th ed. 1963).
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IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS
The foregoing discussion may be conveniently summarized by dis-
tinguishing several different contexts:
(a) Different Return. When in a refund suit the government asserts
as a defense or set-off that the taxpayer owes a deficiency in tax for a
different taxable year, or for a different tax, than that put in issue
by the taxpayer, the government has the burden of proof as to such
new matter.9' This situation cannot arise in Tax Court, since it may
only determine whether a particular deficiency is correct.
(b) Same Return-New Item. Suppose a statutory notice of defici-
ency is based upon the disallowance of a deduction for charitable
contributions, and the government, at the litigation stage, claims for
the first time that the taxpayer had unreported income from gambling
in the same taxable year. This may be conveniently described as a
"new item" which relates to the same taxable period. In Tax Court
the government bears the burden of proof as to such a new item.
Although the language in many cases suggests a contrary result in
refund suits, the holdings of most of these cases do not support
such a proposition. The cases squarely holding that the burden is
on the taxpayer are of questionable authority. And one soundly
reasoned case has suggested that at least the burden of going forward
with the evidence is on the government. 92
(c) Same Return and Same Item-New Factual Matter. Suppose in
the previous situation the charitable deduction was originally dis-
allowed on the ground that the donee did not qualify, and that the
government later put in issue whether the amount reported was
actually contributed. The same "item" is under scrutiny, but whereas
the government formerly appeared to accept the taxpayer's statement
as to the amount given, it subsequently introduced a new factual
issue. In refund cases the taxpayer has the burden of proof with
respect to such new matter. In Tax Court, on the other hand, most of
the cases can be aligned with the view that, when the new ground
asserted by the Commissioner raises new factual disputes, the burden
of proof as to such fact questions will be on the Commissioner.9 3
Some Tax Court cases have indicated that, in case of deductions, the
more stringent refund suit rule may apply, but such a position is
difficult to justify.
91. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 338 F.2d 668 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
92. The Tax Court cases have not distinguished between "new item" and "same
item" situations, but have applied the same rule in both. For example, Eva Rubin,
supra note 20, and A. F. Lowes Lumber Co., supra note 20, both of which are in the
"same item" category, hold that the burden of proof is on the Commissioner as to new
factual matter.
93. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. A special rule for deductions would
appear to have little to commend it.
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(d) Same Return and Same Item-New Legal Theory. Finally,
when the new ground asserted by the Commissioner is merely a new
legal theory, and involves the allegation of no facts which were
not previously in dispute, the burden of proof is not affected. For
example, suppose the Commissioner disallowed a deduction on
grounds of lack of substantiation. If he later claimed in addition that,
even if the payment were made, to allow the deduction would be
contrary to public policy, this new theory might involve no new facts.
Both in Tax Court and in a refund suit the taxpayer would have
the burden of proving the payment was made; a decision as to
whether the law permits such a deduction would be made without the
benefit of presumptions or burdens. 4
Because refund suits and actions in Tax Court are today but
alternative methods of contesting a tax deficiency, the choice of
forum should not affect the result in litigation. Moreover, because of
the finality of the taxpayer's choice of forum, fairness dictates that,
if the taxpayer is to be afforded such a choice, he be permitted to make
it with some assurance that the factual issues on which he must bear
the burden of proof will not be changed.
For example, suppose an estate tax deficiency is based upon the
inclusion in the estate of property allegedly transferred in contempla-
tion of death. The taxpayer may well decide that this issue should
be heard by a jury, and therefore follow the refund suit route. Now,
if the Commissioner in his answer abandons this ground, but asserts
that the decedent retained an interest in the property in question, the
taxpayer is committed to a district court trial of a technical issue which
he might have preferred to submit to the Tax Court.
Of course, the Commissioner is always free in the first instance
to assert alternative, inconsistent bases for a deficiency. But if he
does make such an assertion, the taxpayer is then informed as to
what issues he must be prepared to meet. A tax case will commonly
involve several issues, some of which might point to the Tax Court,
while others indicate a district court or the Court of Claims. Since
it is administratively impractical to allow separate trials on each
issue, the taxpayer must weigh all the considerations and decide
which forum, on the balance, would be the best for his case as a
whole. What is important is that he have all the cards on the table
when he makes that decision.
In order to avoid the burden of proof as to new matter, the Com-
missioner, in some instances, has worded the deficiency notice in
broad and general terms. Carried to its logical extreme, this practice
would, if condoned by the courts, permit a deficiency notice merely
94. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Hover, 268
F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1959).
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to declare that so much is owed "under Section 11 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954," with the burden of proof remaining on the
taxpayer as to a later specification of how the deficiency is determined.
Unfortunately, the Code does not require the deficiency notice to be
in any particular form, or to specify the nature of the deficiency.
And although the government can be compelled to make a vague
deficiency notice more definite once the case is in the Tax Court,
a district court, or the Court of Claims, the additional information
will be too late to guide the taxpayer in the choice of forum. The law
should be amended to require deficiency notices to specify the grounds
for the deficiency in reasonable detail, and to extend the time for
petition to Tax Court to permit a taxpayer to seek clarification of a
vague deficiency notice.
In any discussion of the tax law, consideration must be given to the
public policy in favor of protecting the tax revenues. On the
question under discussion, considerations of fairness outweigh this
policy. However, it may be urged that there should be a means for
the government to change its grounds for a deficiency without assum-
ing the burden of proof. Under present law, the sending of an
amended deficiency notice is beyond the authority of the Com-
missioner.95 If amended deficiency notices were permitted, a provision
similar to that in section 7422(e). 96 which permits a fresh choice of
forum in one situation, would satisfy consideration of fairness while
affording the government the opportunity to inject new matters with-
out assuming the burden of proof.
Whether or not remedial legislation is adopted, protection of the
taxpayer in his choice of forum is a factor which ought to be con-
sidered in fixing the burden of proof in tax litigation. If the proper
weight is attached to this factor, and prior decisions are analyzed
carefully in light of their precedential value, future courts in refund
cases may arrive at a rule closer to that presently followed in the
Tax Court.
95. Agnes McCue, 1 T.C. 986 (1943).
96. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7422(e).
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